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‘Reformation’ or ‘ruin’? The impeachment of the Duke of Buckingham 
and early Stuart politics. 
David Coast 
On 2 May 1626 an important debate took place in the House of Commons. Charles I 
had called parliament, which met in February, to supply the money he desperately 
needed to continue his war with Spain. Yet although MPs offered three subsidies and 
three fifteenths, and later increased their offer, they refused to pass a subsidy bill 
before their grievances were addressed. Chief among these grievances was the 
continuation in office of the Duke of Buckingham, the royal favourite and Lord 
Admiral, who was blamed for the mismanagement of the war with Spain and 
attacked for his near-monopoly of counsel and patronage. The Duke’s opponents in 
the House of Commons, led by a former client, Sir John Eliot, began their attack by 
investigating the expenditure of the parliamentary subsidies granted in 1624, as well 
as Buckingham’s alleged responsibility for the decline of Anglo-French relations 
following his re-arrest of a French ship, the St. Peter.1 When these initial forays failed 
to produce results, an M.P. named Samuel Turner presented a series of questions 
about Buckingham’s leadership, his sale of offices and his supposed support for 
Catholic recusants.2 Turner’s dramatic intervention reinvigorated and widened the 
attack on Buckingham, forming the basis of an investigation that resulted in the 
preparation of thirteen charges against him.3  
The debate on 2 May was intended to decide whether these charges should 
be presented to the King or to the House of Lords. Parliament’s medieval power to 
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impeach ministers had only recently been reasserted during the parliaments of 1621 
and 1624, when Francis Bacon, Viscount St. Alban, Lionel Cranfield, Earl of Middlesex 
and others had been impeached for reasons that had as much to do with court 
politics as corruption. As such, procedures had not yet been formalised and the 
question of who should judge Buckingham’s case was still open. The decision hinged 
on the larger question of whether the investigation of Buckingham aimed at 
correcting his faults or removing him from power. Sir William Beecher, Sir George 
Goring and Sir Robert Harley, all government spokesmen, insisted that by 
transmitting the charges to the King, the Commons would prove that they aimed at 
the ‘reformation’ of the Duke, meaning the correction of his errors, rather than his 
‘ruin’ or ‘removal’, which, as the recent impeachment of St. Alban and Middlesex 
suggested would be the likely result of sending the charges to the Lords.4  
The notion that the investigation into Buckingham aimed at the Duke’s 
‘reformation’ rather than his ‘ruin’ held rhetorical appeal for both sides, at least in 
the initial stages of the impeachment. On the one hand, Buckingham’s critics were 
anxious to avoid alienating potential supporters or provoking a premature 
dissolution. It was therefore necessary to proceed carefully. By presenting the 
impeachment as an attempt to ‘reform’ the duke’s errors rather than ‘ruin’ him, 
Turner and his allies were able to reassure uncommitted MPs who might balk at an 
overt attempt at political assassination.5 Buckingham also appealed to the notion 
that his opponents wanted to ‘reform’ him. In his response to the charges, he drily 
expressed a hope that the Commons were proceeding ‘out of a Christian charity, to 
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punish or mend my faults (if fame could have proved them), and not to ruin my 
reputation or destroy my fortune’.6 This hope was to prove unfounded. 
By arguing that the charges against Buckingham should be sent to the King 
rather than the House of Lords, Beecher, Goring and Harley were attempting to call 
the bluff of Buckingham’s enemies and force them to define their aims. If MPs truly 
wanted the ‘reformation’ of the Duke, they would send the charges to Charles. By 
this point, however, Buckingham’s enemies in the Commons were no doubt 
emboldened by events in the House of Lords, where Buckingham had become the 
subject of a separate attack by the Earl of Bristol. The day before the debate in the 
Commons, Bristol accused the Duke, among other things, of taking Charles to Spain 
in 1623 to convert him to Catholicism. In the Commons, MPs argued that judgement 
by the Lords was the ordinary way, and that Buckingham would receive a ‘noble and 
worthy’ trial, like St. Alban and Middlesex before him.7 Walter Long even made the 
astonishingly insincere argument that Charles would find the evidence and charges 
against his favourite ‘too tedious’ to consider, and should therefore ‘not be troubled 
withal’.8 In the end, the Commons voted to transmit the charges to the Lords, where 
they were presented on 8 and 10 of May.9 Faced with a choice between securing 
supply or protecting his favourite, Charles opted for the latter and finally dissolved 
the parliament on 15 June. 
The revisionist interpretation of these events was counter-intuitive. One of 
the challenges for revisionist historians was to explain how attacks on figures like 
Buckingham could emerge in a supposedly conservative, harmonious and court-
centred political culture. In Parliaments and English Politics, Conrad Russell therefore 
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turned the Commons’ investigation into Buckingham on its head, arguing that it was 
not an attack at all, but part of a search for compromise. Russell took MPs’ rhetoric 
about ‘ruin’ and ‘reformation’ literally, arguing that the aim of the investigation, at 
least in its early stages, was not to ‘ruin’ Buckingham by removing him from power, 
but to ‘reform’ the Duke by persuading him to give up the Admiralty and effect a 
minor ministerial reshuffle. Secret negotiations were supposedly going on between 
Buckingham and his parliamentary critics about the details of the compromise. 
Although these talks broke down because of the intransigence of both sides, their 
existence demonstrated that the impeachment should be interpreted as a search for 
compromise rather than an episode of political and ideological conflict. Indeed, 
there were no real ideological differences between Buckingham and his critics. The 
attack was in any case orchestrated not by members of the Commons but by 
powerful court patrons like the Earl of Pembroke, and it was in the House of Lords 
that the real action took place. The House of Commons played only a minor role, 
since Charles had given up hope of securing subsidies by Easter, and only kept 
parliament in being in order to secure justice against the Earl of Bristol, who had 
been accused of treason.10  
Russell’s broader interpretation of early Stuart politics has of course come in 
for wide-ranging criticism.11 Nevertheless, his interpretation of the Parliament of 
1626 has remained influential. In a recent debate on Charles I’s historical reputation, 
Mark Kishlansky cited Russell’s work as evidence that Charles was willing to offer his 
opponents a ‘gracious compromise’ in 1626.12 Even post-revisionist historians, while 
disagreeing with Russell about the reasons for the dissolution of parliament and the 
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content of negotiations, have tended to go along with the notion that a compromise 
between Buckingham and his enemies was being negotiated behind the scenes.13 
There have been some important exceptions to this rule. Thomas Cogswell and 
Alastair Bellany have recently argued that Buckingham’s opponents in Parliament 
hoped to diminish and perhaps destroy the Duke, and that the ‘ruin’ of the Duke was 
‘something akin to a holy crusade’.14 Christopher Thompson has also recently 
highlighted the lack of evidence for negotiations between Buckingham and his 
opponents, arguing that opposition to the Duke was so implacable as to make such 
negotiations highly implausible.15 Nevertheless, Russell’s argument that the 
impeachment aimed at the ‘reformation’ rather than the ‘ruin’ of the Duke has only 
begun to be challenged. The evidential basis for his interpretation has never been 
fully analysed, and his persuasive narrative of the parliament has remained relatively 
immune to post-revisionist reinterpretation. 
Critics praised Parliaments and English Politics for its ‘magisterial handling of 
detailed evidence’ and wrote that Russell’s ‘superb control of the evidence is 
immediately apparent’.16 More recently, his reading of the evidence has been 
described as ‘careful’ and his speculations about the reshuffle ‘brilliant’.17 Yet as I 
hope to show, Russell’s interpretation rests on a misreading of the sources. There is 
no evidence that negotiations of the sort Russell envisaged were taking place. On the 
contrary, although positions hardened as the investigation proceeded, it is clear that 
many of Buckingham’s critics in the House of Commons sought his ‘ruin’ rather than 
his ‘reformation’ from the outset. Both revisionist and post-revisionist historians 
have tended to minimise the importance of the House of Commons’ impeachment 
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proceedings, arguing that the Earl of Bristol’s intervention in the Lords was more 
significant. This article aims to reassert the importance of the Commons’ attack on 
Buckingham, arguing that it was much more uncompromising and ideologically 
charged than historians have previously argued, and that members of the Commons 
acted much more independently of noble patrons than Russell believed. Russell 
argued that it was only Bristol’s trial in the Lords that kept the parliament in being 
for so long, since Charles had abandoned hopes of securing parliamentary supply. 
This article will argue instead that Charles had grounds to believe that he could 
secure the subsidies he needed, and only dissolved the parliament when it became 
apparent that the Commons could not grant the money they had promised 
according to their own timetable.  
In addition, this article will argue that ideological divisions between the 
Crown and some members of parliament were both revealed and deepened by the 
attack on Buckingham. Throughout the session, Buckingham came to be associated 
with absolutist policies and support for, or at least a dangerous tolerance of, 
Catholics and Arminians. The hostility and intransigence of both sides only makes 
sense in light of ideological conflict in which much more than the fate of a single 
minister, or even a choice of military strategies, was at stake.  A reconsideration of 
this episode helps us to understand why the political atmosphere soured so quickly 
at the start of Charles’ reign. Although the apparent consensus and optimism of the 
‘blessed revolution’ in 1624 had already largely evaporated by 1626, the attempted 
impeachment of the Duke of Buckingham intensified the political crisis.18 The 
 7 
impeachment and the ideological issues it raised help us to explain the conflicts, 
misunderstandings and paranoia of the later sixteen-twenties. 
I 
 
Russell’s claim that MPs were negotiating with Buckingham and merely wanted to 
‘reform’ him rests on four sources. The first two are diplomatic dispatches. 
According to Russell, ‘the existence of negotiations was remarked upon in passing’ 
by the Venetian and French ambassadors.19 In fact, neither ambassador alluded to 
negotiations of the kind that Russell imagined. The Venetian ambassador, Zuane 
Pesaro, merely wrote that Buckingham had ‘approached many members with 
various proposals and inducements to help his cause’.20 In other words, Buckingham 
was attempting to buy his opponents off with promises of titles and pensions. As a 
document written by an opponent of the Duke later complained, Buckingham had 
‘shamefully & basely attempted to drawe diuers of both howses by promises of 
Rewards & offices to bee for the vpholding of his partie’.21 Buckingham’s use of 
patronage to secure his acquittal did not imply that he was negotiating to relinquish 
his own offices.  
A ‘casual allusion by Mende... to the possibility of Buckingham giving up 
offices’ was also interpreted as evidence for negotiations.22 Mende, the Queen’s 
Almoner, was acting as French ambassador during this period. In fact, Mende wrote 
that Buckingham would allow his parliamentary opponents to ‘strip’ him of his 
offices, knowing that he could rely on Charles’ favour to restore him to power in the 
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end.23 Negotiating to relinquish offices and allowing them to be forcefully taken 
from you are not the same things. These comments also need to be placed in the 
context of Mende’s wider analysis of the impeachment. Mende and other foreign 
observers like the Florentine ambassador, Amerigo Salvetti, wrote that Buckingham 
would ultimately remain in power as long as Charles continued to protect him, and 
that the Duke believed that the House of Lords would exonerate him. Even if he was 
successfully impeached and his offices were taken from him, however, Charles could 
simply pardon and restore him once the Commons had granted the subsidies that 
they had promised.24 Buckingham similarly gave the Earl of Clare the impression that 
he was confident that the Lords would find him innocent. 25  By mid-May, 
Buckingham’s position appeared more precarious. The Earl of Bristol’s accusations of 
treason, as well as the allegations of Buckingham’s involvement in James’ death 
raised the stakes considerably.26 The release of the Earl of Arundel and his return to 
the Lords put Buckingham under additional pressure. For much of the investigation 
in March and April, however, the Duke had reason to believe that he would be 
exonerated. Mende’s comments therefore do not support the claim that 
Buckingham was negotiating with his opponents. Instead the Duke appears to have 
believed that his position was strong enough that negotiations were unnecessary.  
The fact that Charles allowed the investigation into Buckingham to continue 
has been presented as evidence that a negotiated compromise was in the works. 
Russell pointed to a letter written by Benjamin Rudyerd on 22 April, in which he 
expressed a hope that ‘we have ridden out all our storms, for his Majesty hath given 
us leave to proceed with our grievances’. According to Russell, this letter indicated 
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that ‘a compromise might work’.27 A closer examination of Charles’ decision to allow 
the attack on Buckingham to continue allows us to consider whether it really 
represented a genuine offer of compromise, let alone evidence of negotiations 
between Buckingham and his parliamentary opponents.  
Charles had made his opposition to the investigation against Buckingham 
clear from an early stage. His message on 14 March denounced Samuel Turner’s 
‘queries’ as ‘against the honor and government of himself and his blessed father’. 
The King called for the Commons to punish Turner and threatened that he was not 
restrained from doing so himself.28 On 29 March, the Lord Keeper, speaking on the 
King’s behalf, demanded that the Commons end their investigation into Buckingham 
and ‘commit unto his Majesty’s care, wisdom and justice the future reformation of 
those things which you suppose to be amiss’.29 Despite these messages, many MPs, 
as well as individuals outside of parliament were eager to seize upon any indication 
that Charles would allow the attack on Buckingham to continue. On 23 March it was 
falsely rumoured that Charles had sent a letter bidding the Commons to ‘goe on 
cheerfully, and if so they had sufficient matter against any of his he would not 
protect them’. 30  MPs were no doubt encouraged by the recent history of 
parliamentary judicature. During the impeachment of Lord Chancellor St. Alban in 
1621, and Lord Treasurer Middlesex in 1624, James had publicly insisted that if his 
ministers had committed crimes, he would not stand in the way of their investigation 
and punishment. It was not unreasonable for MPs to think that Charles would allow 
and perhaps even welcome the attack on Buckingham if the Duke’s alleged offences 
were uncovered.  
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Charles’ uncompromising speech on 29 March provoked the Commons’ 
remonstrance of 5 April, after which parliament went in to recess for Easter. When 
they returned, Charles was careful to avoid directly ordering an end to the 
investigation. Instead he simply asked the Commons to lay their resmonstrance and 
all other diversions aside and speedily grant him subsidies, without mentioning 
Buckingham.31 When Sir Thomas Grantham claimed that this message amounted to 
a ‘restraint’ on the investigation, the Chancellor of the Exchequer swiftly responded 
that Charles was not restraining them from anything. 32  On 20 April Charles 
reinforced this message by telling the Commons that he did not intend to ‘prevent 
your just grievances or his giving you satisfaction therein’, but simply wanted them 
to grant him subsidies first.33 The King’s ambiguous language was interpreted highly 
creatively, even perversely, as a green light for the attack on Buckingham. Sir Edwin 
Sandys praised Charles for using the ‘most mild and gracious language’, arguing that 
the Commons should therefore ‘hold on our course in our grievances, specially with 
those that have brought the kingdom into this distress’.34 On 26 April, the Commons 
decided to vote a fourth subsidy, and it was only after this, on 29 April, that Charles 
told them that he had ‘given way’ to the inquiry, asking them to hurry up and 
present the charges, either to himself or the Lords.35  
Seen in this context, Charles’ decision to allow the Commons’ investigation 
into Buckingham to continue was neither a generous offer of compromise nor 
evidence that a negotiated settlement was on the cards. Rudyerd was not alluding to 
a compromise agreement but was merely expressing relief that Charles had 
apparently allowed the investigation to continue, despite his earlier opposition. 
 11 
Charles had been brought, reluctantly and by degrees, to allow the investigation to 
go ahead in return for the promise of another subsidy. While he had agreed to 
redress ‘just’ grievances, it was obvious that he did not regard Buckingham’s actions 
as falling within that category, and he had already made it clear that the Duke had 
merely acted on royal orders at all times.  
 The fourth source Russell presented for the existence of negotiations were 
the speeches made by Sir William Beecher, Sir George Goring and Sir Robert Harley 
in the House of Commons on 2 May. According to Russell, by advocating the 
‘reformation’ of the Duke, these three speakers, who were all ‘well-informed 
partisans of the Duke’, clearly demonstrated a belief that ‘a compromise had been 
worked out’ between Buckingham and his enemies.36 Mark Kishlansky has similarly 
argued that Charles offered the Commons ‘a gracious compromise indeed’ when he 
asked them to send him the charges so that he could ‘reform’ Buckingham 
personally.37  Yet since Charles had already made it abundantly clear that he 
considered Buckingham innocent, it is unlikely that any ‘reformation’ would in fact 
have taken place if he received them.38 It seems more likely that Charles would 
simply have exonerated the Duke, effectively ending the impeachment proceedings. 
This was presumably what government spokesmen liked Beecher, Goring and Harley 
hoped for when arguing that the charges should be sent to the King rather than the 
House of Lords. Kishlansky argued that if the charges were sent to the King, MPs 
would still have leverage, since they could hold the subsidy bill up in committee until 
they received satisfaction from the King.39 Yet if the King exonerated the Duke, the 
Commons’ investigation would have effectively run its course. While Bristol’s attack 
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in the Lords would continue, and the Duke’s enemies in the Commons might come 
up with other avenues of investigation, one of the central lines of attack would be 
exhausted, and they would no doubt come under further pressure to grant the 
subsidies they had promised in return. The likelihood that Charles would simply 
exonerate his favourite explains why Buckingham’s critics voted to send the charges 
to the Lords. By doing so, they could ratchet up the pressure on the Duke by enlisting 
the support of his aristocratic enemies. When we place the speeches of Beecher, 
Goring and Harley in the context of the debate in which they were made, it is clear 
that they do not imply any belief in a compromise settlement. They were part of a 
debating tactic intended to end the attack on Buckingham rather than evidence of 
knowledge about negotiations. 
II 
 
While Russell acknowledged that there was no direct evidence of negotiations 
between Buckingham and his enemies, he nevertheless speculated about their 
possible terms. In the absence of other evidence, he turned to ‘the public demands 
of the Duke’s critics’ as embodied in Turner’s queries for clues about the terms of 
any settlement. Since ‘the case against the Duke had been put forward in a way 
which did not make a compromise impossible’, one could use Turner’s queries ‘to 
consider what concessions might have satisfied’ his opponents.40 Having committed 
himself to the position that negotiations were taking place in late April, Russell 
interpreted Turner’s queries, presented on 11 March, as a blueprint for compromise, 
thereby inverting the traditional Whig interpretation and transforming an overt 
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attack into an attempt at settlement. But were Turner’s queries written in a way that 
deliberately left the door open to compromise, and would Buckingham’s critics have 
been satisfied by the concessions that Russell imagines?   
According to Russell, there was ‘no public attack on the Duke’s tenure of 
Court and Bedchamber offices, the real seat of his power’.41 As such, Buckingham 
could have given up the Admiralty and replaced some of his dependents, while still 
retaining a position at court as royal favourite and patronage broker on the scale of 
the Earl of Somerset, the previous favourite. ‘It is surely interesting’, as Russell says, 
‘that Buckingham’s leading critics said nothing to close such a line of retreat’.42 It 
might appear that this analysis is simply another example of the revisionist tendency 
to argue from silence. Since Buckingham’s critics did not explicitly call for his removal 
from all offices, it is assumed that this is not what they wanted. Of course, it would 
have been tactically unwise for MPs to overtly demand Buckingham’s ‘ruin’ at the 
outset, given the need to retain the support of uncommitted MPs and to present the 
investigation as fair and even-handed. Leaving this aside, the claim that 
Buckingham’s critics made no attack on his position at court is false. Three of the six 
queries Turner presented directly or implicitly criticised Buckingham’s role as court 
patronage broker. The second query complained about the ‘unmeasurable gifts and 
lands’ bestowed on Buckingham and members of his family, a practice in which he 
was at the very least complicit, even if they had been granted by the King. The third 
criticised his monopoly of office and the fact that he had procured positions for 
members of his family who were incapable of performing their duties. The fifth 
query criticised his sale of titles, offices, places of judicature and ecclesiastical 
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livings.43 Clearly, Buckingham’s critics were not leaving the door open for him to 
retain the near-monopoly of court patronage that he currently enjoyed.  
Having argued that Buckingham’s critics would have been satisfied with the 
redistribution of a few offices, Russell carried out a speculative reshuffle on Charles’ 
behalf. Firstly, Buckingham would have given up the Admiralty. According to Russell, 
the sixth query, which criticised Buckingham’s failure to lead the recent military 
expedition against Cadiz in person, was simply a complaint about ‘the duke staying 
at home being Admiral’. As he went on to say, ‘In time of war, the case for having a 
Lord Admiral whose other duties did not tie him constantly to the court was a strong 
one’.44 Buckingham’s friends and clients had privately advised him to give up the 
admiralty, and Russell presents Turner’s query as being made in a similar spirit of 
friendly advice.45 By presenting the query as a sensible concern that Buckingham 
could not run the admiralty while also attending to his other duties, Russell 
minimised its severity. In fact, the query is much more specific and critical. Turner 
suggested that Buckingham had appointed ‘unworthie’ officers to lead the Cadiz 
expedition, despite being appointed admiral and general of the fleet himself. This 
had been the ‘cause of the bad and dishonourable success’ of the expedition, which 
he implied had not been ‘rightly designed’ by the Duke.46 Other critics went further. 
Sir William Walter was probably alluding to the Cadiz expedition when he said that 
Charles should appoint councillors who were ‘men of courage such as will execute 
their own places, and not commit them to base and under-serving deputies’.47 Eliot 
even seemed to imply that Buckingham had deliberately sabotaged the expedition. 
In a draft of the speech he delivered on 10 February, he complained that ‘our honor 
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is ruin’d, our ships are suncke, our men perisht, not by the sword, not by an enemy 
not by chance; but apparantly desired beforehand out of strong predictions, by 
those we trust’.48 The Duke’s critics did not simply believe that he was spreading 
himself too thinly, but were accusing him of disastrous incompetence, dereliction of 
duty or worse. His responsibility for the fiasco at Cadiz, if proved, would surely 
require a more severe punishment than his replacement as Lord Admiral by the earl 
of Warwick. In a similar vein, Russell argued that concerns that Buckingham and his 
kindred received too many gifts of land and money could be allayed (and all previous 
gifts presumably forgiven and absolved) if Charles appointed a new Lord Treasurer.49 
Turner’s concerns about the growth of recusancy, which he suspected was a result of 
the Duke’s underhand protection of papists, could apparently be alleviated by the 
replacement of Lord Scrope as President of the Council of the North.50   
While there is no evidence that Buckingham was negotiating for a reshuffle, 
we are also entitled to ask whether it was even plausible that he might give up the 
admiralty and consent to the replacement of his clients. While it is true that 
Buckingham’s friends had advised him to assuage the jealousy of his rivals by giving 
up some offices, this was very different from having them taken from him. For the 
most part, Tudor and Stuart ministers, and particularly favourites, did not willingly 
part with their offices. Ministers like Sir Robert Naunton who returned from disgrace 
were in a minority; the careers of most ministers did not tend to have second acts. 
The all-or-nothing nature of politics meant that most ended their careers either by 
dying in office, or having their offices forcibly taken through disgrace, imprisonment, 
execution or assassination. Even a minor loss of office tended to be interpreted by 
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observers as an augury of inevitable destruction, and such small reverses may have 
had a self-fulfilling potential. Shortly before the parliament, one of Buckingham’s 
supporters referred to a rumour that he had lost the Mastership of the Horse, and 
alluded to the belief that ‘this prime feather of yours being lost... it will not be long 
ere the rest follow’.51 Rivals were rarely satisfied with a partial victory, since 
favourites who were merely wounded might recover and exact revenge. Once 
courtiers began sliding down the slippery pole of court politics, it was very difficult to 
prevent momentum from carrying them to the very bottom. It was perhaps this logic 
that led James and Charles to continue piling yet more honours on the Duke as a sign 
of royal confidence. Charles exerted pressure for Buckingham’s election as 
Chancellor of Cambridge during the impeachment and prohibited the Commons 
from discussing it.52  
While it seems unlikely that either side would have been satisfied with a 
reshuffle, and there is no evidence that negotiations for such a compromise took 
place, there is plenty of evidence that the Duke’s enemies wanted him to be 
dismissed rather than ‘reformed’, and observers tended to believe that this was the 
aim of the investigation. Just prior to Turner’s speech, a London newsletter writer 
passed on the rumour that a member had thirteen articles against Buckingham, 
‘which will either break him or dissolve it’.53 An early list of charges in Eliot’s papers 
alluded to rumours that he was responsible for James’s death, concluding that he 
was ‘vicious ergo not fitt to be soe neere a Kinge’.54 A forged letter from the King of 
Denmark that circulated in March claimed that there was ‘a Subiect in your 
Kingdome that rules it more then your selfe’ and threatened to end the war in 
 17 
Germany unless Buckingham was removed.55 Well before the period during which 
negotiations are supposed to have taken place, Eliot was calling for the removal of 
‘those counsels by which those ill effects have been produced’, and referred to 
precedents from the reigns of Henry III and Richard II, when parliament forced the 
dismissal of an unpopular minister by withholding supply.56  
Buckingham’s supporters also seemed to believe that his opponents aimed 
for his removal from power. Sir James Bagg warned the Duke that Pembroke and his 
allies in the House of Commons hoped to ruin him. 57  Speeches written by 
Buckingham’s supporters asked members to ‘consider what a Taske we vndertake in 
thinking to teare him from the sydes of the king’ and claimed that they aimed to ‘pull 
out of [Charles’] bosom... those whom he has cause to affect’.58 Rather than defining 
the terms for a settlement, Turner’s queries were interpreted by foreign observers 
as setting King and Commons on a collision course, and that one or the other would 
have to yield. The French ambassador wrote that Turner’s queries had so inflamed 
the Commons that they could not easily draw back from the course they had now 
taken.59 The Venetian ambassador wrote that the Duke ‘must either fall or be 
broken’ as a result of the Commons’ investigation, while the Florentine ambassador 
wrote that the Commons intended to ‘vanquish and cast down the Duke’, and that a 
majority were ‘straining to compass the ruin of the Duke’.60  
III 
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While the ‘reformation of the Duke’ that Russell envisaged was clearly not on the 
cards, a different sort of ‘reformation’ has been proposed by Thomas Cogswell.61 In a 
recent article, Cogswell argued that Russell was correct about the existence of 
negotiations between the crown and leaders of the attack on Buckingham, but 
wrong about the nature of the proposed compromise. Rather than the ministerial 
reshuffle envisaged by Russell, the negotiations focused on the creation of a joint 
stock company that would wage war on Spain. The company would finance a fleet to 
attack Spanish possessions in the West Indies and protect English shipping in the 
channel. Sir Dudley Digges introduced a proposal for such a company in the House of 
Commons on 14 March, and a committee was set up to discuss it. Shortly 
afterwards, the Somers Island Company instructed the governor of Bermuda to 
prepare for the arrival of warships intended to attack the West Indies.62 A month 
later, the committee had worked out many of the details, and Digges reported back 
to the House, but the proposal slipped off the parliamentary agenda in May and 
came to nothing. Cogswell does not simply rely on Russell’s evidence for the 
existence of negotiations for this proposal, but also cites the Florentine ambassador, 
Salvetti, who wrote that ‘consultations are being held’ about the project.63 In 
addition, Cogswell points to the fact that several different versions of the proposal 
were written, suggesting that negotiations were taking place.64 By superseding 
Buckingham’s authority as Lord Admiral and setting war finance on a new, voluntary 
footing, the company would have resolved the conflict between King and 
parliament, providing a ‘soft political landing’ for Buckingham and the crown.65 As 
Cogswell has argued, the proposal demonstrates that ‘there was indeed a serious 
effort at the duke’s reformation’.66  
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While Salvetti did indeed refer to ‘consultations’ about the project, it is not 
clear whether he was referring to negotiations between MPs and the government.67 
The ‘consultations’, as well as the various surviving iterations of the proposal may 
simply point to internal discussions in Digges’ committee about the details of the 
company and how it could be made palatable to both parliament and the crown. 
Even if negotiations really did take place between Digges and the government, the 
proposal for a West India company was entirely compatible with the removal of 
Buckingham. As Cogswell points out, the project had the potentially ‘revolutionary’ 
aim of expanding parliamentary authority by placing the financing and conduct of 
the war in the hands of a company set up by parliament, thus superseding the 
Admiralty and Privy Council. The proposal was not a promising basis for compromise 
between the crown and parliament, and could just as easily complement the attack 
on the Duke as offer a ‘reforming’ alternative to it.68 Digges’ own behaviour suggests 
that the proposal and the attack went hand in hand. While he did not support Eliot’s 
early lines of inquiry, he participated in the attack on Buckingham before, during and 
after the period when negotiations over the creation of a West India Company are 
supposed to have taken place. On 28 February Digges implied that Buckingham was 
responsible for the failure of the Cadiz expedition.69 On 17 March, a few days after 
the proposal was introduced, he supported Turner’s charges against Buckingham’s 
monopoly of office and sale of honours, and on 20 April, he proposed to lay aside all 
other business until the investigation of the Duke was completed.70 By the time the 
West India Company had slipped off the parliamentary agenda, Digges had been 
imprisoned for his strongly-worded preamble to the charges against Buckingham 
presented on 8 and 10 May.  
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IV 
 
By arguing that the investigation of Buckingham was a matter of high political 
negotiation and reshuffle, Russell was able to present it as a court conflict that 
happened to be played out in parliament. Members of the House of Commons were 
denied any real independent initiative and were instead cast as the loyal but overly-
enthusiastic attack dogs of their noble masters.71 ‘Not for the last time’, as Russell 
wrote, ‘it had proved easier to call in the Commons as critics of an unpopular 
minister than it was to call them off when they had served the purpose of those who 
first called them in’.72 Pembroke and Arundel were portrayed as the real driving 
force behind the attack, although Arundel’s influence was limited by his 
imprisonment.73 Many of the leaders of the attack in the House of Commons, 
including Eliot and Turner, were ‘Pembroke men’ who either owed their seats to the 
earl or were actively seeking his patronage.74 Simon Adams made a similar though 
more nuanced case that Pembroke co-ordinated the attack.75  
The claim that Buckingham’s enemies in the Commons were acting on the 
orders of their noble patrons is certainly plausible. Buckingham’s friends believed 
that Pembroke had worked to ‘ruin’ him through his clients in the House of 
Commons in 1625 and 1626.76 Sir James Bagg claimed that William Coryton, the key 
figure in Pembroke’s powerful patronage network, had boasted to him that he had 
secured the return of several MPs, including John Eliot, Sir Robert Mansell, Sir 
Francis Stuart, Sir Clippesby Crewe, Samuel Turner and William Murray.77 Other 
prominent critics of Buckingham, like Sir Dudley Digges, had strong links with the 
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Archbishop of Canterbury, George Abbott, and Digges was later questioned about 
whether Abbot had been behind the attack.78 Pembroke was the brother-in-law and 
close friend of the Arundel, another powerful enemy of Buckingham who had been 
imprisoned to prevent him from taking his seat in the House of Lords. In the Autumn 
of 1625, Pembroke had also visited the Earl of Bristol, and may have provided him 
with information that he used against Buckingham in his sensational speech on 1 
May.79 Bristol was also known to have supporters in the Commons. A warrant drawn 
up after the dissolution called for Bristol, along with MPs including Sir John 
Strangeways, Walsingham Gresley and Simon Digby to be examined for their 
behaviour during the session.80 The Earl of Middlesex, another discontented victim 
of Buckingham, also explored the possibility of allying with the Duke’s parliamentary 
enemies in April, although he abandoned these plans when they began implicating 
the Duke in the death of James I.81  
While it is easy to find ties of friendship and patronage between 
Buckingham’s enemies at court and in the House of Commons, precisely how these 
ties translated into political action is less clear. While Coryton, Eliot, Mansell, Stuart 
and Pembroke’s kinsman Sir Edward Herbert were of course prominent opponents 
of Buckingham in 1626, other ‘Pembroke men’ named by Bagg were not. Crewe 
played no discernable role in the attack, while Murray was moderately supportive of 
the Duke.82 The fact that Eliot thought it necessary to bribe Pembroke’s attendants 
in order to secure an office from the Earl shortly before parliament met indicates 
that their relationship was not initially close, and it seems that his alliance with 
Pembroke was the result, rather than the cause, of his attack on Buckingham.83 
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Indeed, Eliot’s strenuous efforts to bring Bishop Williams and the Earl of Middlesex 
in on his side suggests that the initiative for the formation of an alliance against 
Buckingham came as much from members of the House of Commons as from their 
allies in the Lords.84 Other leaders of the attack, like Christopher Wandesford, do not 
appear to have owed their seats to court patrons, and it is not clear that opponents 
like Mansell, who had already attacked Buckingham in 1625, were doing anything 
under Pembroke’s patronage that they would not have done if they had secured 
seats through other means. In fact, the experience of 1625 suggested that Members 
of the Commons were quite capable of taking the lead in attacking Buckingham. Eliot 
later wrote that in 1625, Buckingham’s enemies at court had only begun to 
encourage the attack through their clients once it had already developed some 
momentum in the House of Commons. According to Eliot, the Duke’s court enemies 
‘did infuse into the humor that was stirr’d what gall and vinegar they might, and by 
their privat instruments blowing the coales then kindled, added also more fewell to 
the fire’.85 As Ann Hughes has argued, peers needed members of the Commons just 
as much as the reverse, and describing such a reciprocal relationship as 
‘dependency’ is misleading.86  
Pembroke’s role in the attack is also ambiguous. Russell points out that it was 
Pembroke, rather than members of the House of Commons, who Buckingham 
attempted to conciliate after parliament was dissolved, implying that it was 
Pembroke who played the leading role in the attack. Buckingham made Pembroke 
Lord Steward of the Household and completed a marriage alliance between his 
daughter and the Earl’s nephew.87 In fact, it was the Pembroke’s brother, the Earl of 
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Montgomery, who had suggested the marriage alliance as a means to reconcile the 
two camps as early as October 1624.88 There had been several attempts to reconcile 
Buckingham and Pembroke, and rumours of his elevation to the Lord Stewardship 
had been circulating before parliament met.89 As John Chamberlain wrote, ‘the Lord 
Chamberlain is like to be Lord Steward this parlament pro tempore [for the time 
being] or further as he shall carrie himself and give cause’.90 The implication was that 
Pembroke’s reward depended on his good behaviour during the parliament, rather 
than simply sealing any reconciliation with Buckingham after the dissolution. The 
fact that the Lord Stewardship and marriage were concluded so soon after the 
dissolution also implies that the reconciliation had been worked out well in advance 
but was withheld during the parliament.91  
Pembroke’s outward behaviour during the early part of the session certainly 
gave Charles and Buckingham little to complain about. He spoke strongly in favour of 
supply and military preparations against Spain.92 One of Buckingham’s allies, Lord 
Montagu, wrote that Pembroke ‘performed his trust very nobly’.93 Although these 
speeches alone did not imply any endorsement of Buckingham, Pembroke also went 
further than might be expected in defending the Duke. He gave a qualified defence 
of Buckingham’s conduct over the loan ships to France, and confirmed that the Duke 
had pawned his own jewels to raise £30,000 for the King of Denmark.94 At least 
initially, Pembroke hedged his bets and kept his distance from the attack. According 
to Bagg, he preferred to ‘appear publicly rather by strangers’ than to act through 
well-known clients of his such as Sir Benjamin Rudyerd.95 In short, Pembroke appears 
to have acted to maximise his freedom of manoeuvre and maintain plausible 
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deniability, giving Buckingham some public support while patronising his critics. It 
was only in May, when the charges against Buckingham had been presented and the 
Earl of Bristol had launched his own devastating attack, that Pembroke appeared to 
throw his weight against the Duke. In his representation of the Commons’ charges in 
the House of Lords, Pembroke went well beyond a neutral account, adding 
additional commentary to the charges that made his own opposition to the Duke 
and his endorsement of the impeachment clear.96 Nevertheless, characterising MPs 
as ‘Pembroke men’ or arguing that Pembroke ‘orchestrated’ the impeachment is 
misleading. While the circumstantial evidence for Pembroke’s involvement in the 
attack on Buckingham is strong, the ties of patronage and friendship between the 
Earl and Buckingham’s opponents in the Commons do not necessarily imply that he 
directed the attack from behind the scenes, or that they were simply his obedient 
spokesmen. We do not need to see MPs as either purely independent actors or the 
lackeys of their noble patrons. Instead the relationship between members of the 
Commons and their patrons in the Lords was one of deferential partnership rather 
than subordination. 
Both Conrad Russell and, more recently, Thomas Cogswell, have tended to 
downplay the importance of the attack on Buckingham in the House of Commons 
and have instead emphasised the importance of the Earl of Bristol’s attack in the 
House of Lords. In his oration to parliament in 1624, Buckingham had accused Bristol 
of misleading the King during the Spanish match negotiations, and Bristol was 
determined to strike back. He had been kept away from parliament, but in April 
Bristol petitioned the House of Lords to take his seat and to be heard as 
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Buckingham’s accuser. Charles responded by asking the Lords to send for Bristol as a 
delinquent, so that he could answer for his supposed offenses in Spain. Bristol, it was 
claimed, was a lackey of Spain and had tried to convert the prince to Catholicism 
during his trip to Madrid in 1623. Bristol entered parliament on 1 May. Before the 
Attorney General could begin his indictment, Bristol accused Buckingham of high 
treason. He claimed that Buckingham had planned the trip to Spain in order to 
convert Charles to Catholicism, also implying that Buckingham had poisoned James 
in order to prevent Bristol from talking to him, thus alluding to allegations that were 
already being investigated in the Commons.  
Russell pointed out that the Lords spent most of their time considering 
Bristol’s case rather than the Commons’ impeachment charges.97 Ignoring the many 
surviving copies of Turner’s queries and the impeachment proceedings, Russell used 
a single contemporary summary of the parliament, which did not mention the 
impeachment, to claim that contemporaries did not view the Commons’ proceedings 
as particularly important.98 According to Russell, Charles kept parliament in being to 
secure a public condemnation of Bristol, rather than to gain subsidies, which Charles 
had supposedly lost hope of securing.99 Cogswell has similarly focused attention on 
Bristol and other pro-Spanish ministers who had been forced out of power in 1624 
and now sought their revenge on Buckingham. Compared to the damaging 
accusations made by Bristol and Dr. Eglisham, the Commons’ charges were 
something of a damp squib. The impeachment was ‘not necessarily career-ending’ 
for Buckingham because the commons were almost comically incapable of 
substantiating their charges with adequate evidence and witnesses, as they had 
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done during previous impeachments.100 Buckingham’s position therefore appeared 
to be secure until Bristol intervened.  
While there is no denying that Bristol’s intervention in the House of Lords 
represented a major escalation of the attack on Buckingham, the impeachment 
proceedings were certainly not a minor matter, as Russell implied, nor was the 
Commons’ attack floundering for lack of evidence. The documents produced by the 
various committees investigating Buckingham certainly show that they tried to 
substantiate their charges and encourage witnesses to come forward, particularly 
when it came to the St. Peter case, Buckingham’s alleged extortion of the East India 
Company, the loan of ships to France and of course the Duke’s ‘transcendent 
presumption’ in offering medicine to James.101  
Nevertheless, many of the charges did not require extensive documentation 
or witnesses. The only evidence needed to prove that Buckingham monopolised 
offices, elevated members of his family or ‘intercepted revenues’ by receiving royal 
gifts were the relevant royal patents and warrants. Indeed, rather than disputing the 
evidence, Buckingham did not even deny many of the charges against him. He 
admitted that he held many offices, that he had bought offices, that he accepted 
money for honours and procured them for his kindred, and that he had received 
many grants of land and money from James and Charles. He simply denied that any 
of these things were against the law.102 While some offences were virtually self-
evident, others, such as the failure to guard the narrow seas, were charges of 
incompetence rather than criminality. Indeed the one of the most threatening 
novelties of the attack on Buckingham was that many of the offences complained of 
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were not technically crimes at all. Pembroke argued that the sale of office was 
illegal, but as he admitted when he represented the charges in the Lords, 
Buckingham’s plurality of offices and purchase of the Admiralty and Wardenship of 
the Cinque Ports were not ‘against any particular law... yet they may be justly 
offered as the roots and causes of the great following crimes, and more’. Moreover, 
they were ‘against the highest law and assume the nature of the highest offenses... 
the welfare and safety of the people and state is the supreme law’.103 Since the 
attack on Buckingham was as much political as legal, the fact that the Commons 
failed to provide conclusive evidence for some of their charges becomes less 
significant. Regardless of the evidence, Charles might be persuaded to part with 
Buckingham in return for the subsidies that he needed so desperately. The House of 
Lords might decide that Buckingham should be found guilty because his removal 
would clear the political logjam and end a dangerous impasse between king and 
parliament during wartime, even if his guilt had not been proved.  
The claim that Charles had essentially given up hope of obtaining subsidies by 
Easter was a key element in Russell’s argument about the relative unimportance of 
the House of Commons during the impeachment. Since the possibility of supply was 
remote, the prosecution of Bristol in the Lords was ‘the only thing which kept the 
Parliament in being’.104 Yet while the attack on Bristol was no doubt important, there 
were reasonable hopes that Charles could secure subsidies, and this seems the most 
fundamental and obvious reason that he allowed parliament to continue. In March 
the Commons resolved to give the King three subsidies and three fifteenths, 
although they would only proceed to a bill once their grievances were addressed. In 
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late April they added a fourth subsidy. While these sums were inadequate for 
Charles’ purposes, they were still very substantial. Given his many commitments and 
the threat of invasion by Spain, the hope of obtaining them was more than enough 
reason to keep parliament in being. While the leaders of the impeachment hoped 
that Charles would remove Buckingham in order to secure the subsidies, the King 
hoped that either Buckingham would be acquitted or that the precariousness of the 
international situation would induce the Commons to proceed to supply.  
There were several reasons for the dissolution. As Richard Cust has argued, 
Charles increasingly saw in the activities of Buckingham’s enemies in the House of 
Commons a threat to his own authority.105 As Charles complained, the attempt by 
the House of Commons to publish a remonstrance attacking Buckingham was an 
important factor.106 The King may also have felt that the tide was finally turning 
against Buckingham in the Lords, particularly after the return of the earl of Arundel 
on 8 June.107 Nevertheless, the refusal of the House of Commons to keep to their 
own timetable for the payment of subsidies was probably the decisive factor.108 
When MPs had resolved to give three subsidies in March, they had promised that 
the first would be paid at the end of June.109 On 9 June, Charles sent the Commons a 
letter pointing out that unless the subsidy bill was enacted very soon, he would be 
unable to raise money or credit by the time the Commons had themselves prefixed 
for payment.110 Instead of proceeding with the subsidy bill, the Commons resolved 
to proceed with their remonstrance, which called for the removal of Buckingham.111 
As Charles later claimed, the Commons’ refusal to proceed to supply in June was the 
final straw, since it had ‘put an impossibilitie vpon themselues to performe their 
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promises’.112 Parliament was only dissolved when it became clear that subsidies 
would not be granted in time to put them to use that summer unless Buckingham 
was removed.  
Charles seems to have had a wider audience in mind in his decision to 
dissolve the parliament. By banning the publication of the Commons’ remonstrance 
and publishing a justification of his actions, Charles indicated how important it was 
to win the propaganda war and convince a wider adjudicating public that he was not 
to blame for the dissolution. As he pointed out in his message to the House of 
Commons on 9 June, if the Commons’ intransigence resulted in a foreign invasion 
‘we may call God and man to witness that we have done our part to prevent it’.113 
His own honour and sense of kingly responsibility was satisfied. If Charles had 
dissolved parliament after Easter, he would have ended any possibility of securing 
supply. By keeping parliament in being, he kept this possibility alive but also 
demonstrated to his subjects how far he was willing to go, despite the threat of 
foreign invasion and the urgency of supply, to satisfy the demands of the Commons.  
V 
 
A compromise between Buckingham and his enemies was possible, according to 
Russell, because there were no real ideological or religious divisions between them. 
‘The gulf between Pembroke and Buckingham was not a gulf of principle’, he wrote, 
‘and therefore could have been bridged by alterations of men rather than of 
measures’.114 Only two ‘ideological’ issues are identified by Russell among the 
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charges brought against Buckingham: his patronage of recusants and arminianism, 
both of which were supposedly minor and easy to resolve.115 Secular ideological 
divisions, according to Russell, did not exist. ‘It is remarkable, when we look at the 
public attacks on the Duke’, he wrote, ‘how little sign there is of any ideological gulf 
dividing him from his critics’.116  
As post-revisionist historians have argued, ideological conflict was an 
important feature of early Stuart politics.117 Yet even here, the influence of the 
political narrative established by Russell is important. While arguing persuasively for 
the existence of ideological conflict, J.P. Sommerville wrote that the impeachment of 
Buckingham was part of a ‘carefully orchestrated campaign masterminded by 
Buckingham’s great rival the Earl of Pembroke’ and, as such, ‘may have had little to 
do with constitutional disputes’.118 In fact, the charges against Buckingham had 
important constitutional implications, and ideological divisions were brought in to 
sharp focus during the process of the investigation and impeachment. Under the 
pressure of events, Buckingham became a symbol for a particular set of royal 
policies, and the precedent of his removal from power or continuation in office had 
implications well beyond the fate of a single favourite. Different assumptions about 
the constitutional plans of the leaders of the attack on one side, and ‘evil councillors’ 
like Buckingham on the other, meant that political moves by the ‘other side’ came to 
seem much more threatening than initial appearances would seem to suggest. 
Indeed, the intransigence and unwillingness to compromise of both sides only makes 
sense in light of these fears and ideological divisions. 
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One of the basic principles at stake was parliament’s right to investigate and 
try the King’s councillors. Although no-one disputed Charles’ right to choose his 
advisers, this right would be of limited use if parliament could remove those it 
disapproved of for purely political reasons, rather than for committing crimes. 
Charles did not want to establish any such precedent, and told the House on 29 
March that their ‘course of inquiring was an example which by no means he could 
suffer, although it had been against his meanest servant much less against one so 
near him’.119 A tract circulating in Buckingham’s circle after the dissolution claimed 
that impeachment would merely have been the first step in a parliamentary power-
grab. If Charles had allowed Buckingham to be toppled, MPs would soon ‘appoint 
him Councellors, Servants, Alliances, Limits of his expences, Accompts of his 
Revenue’. The ‘decourting’ of Buckingham would therefore be ‘the Corner-stone on 
which the demolishing of this Monarchy will be builded’.120 A list of questions drawn 
up by the government for Eliot to answer, presumably during his imprisonment, 
included questions about whether and with whom he had discussed ‘the deposing of 
kings’ and ‘how farr any kings had bene heretofore compelled to give way to the will 
of the people’.121 On the other side, MPs argued that questioning ministers was one 
of parliament’s ancient and inalienable privileges. In the remonstrance to Charles, 
they claimed that ‘it has been the ancient, constant, and undoubted right and usage 
of Parliaments to question and complain of all persons, of what degree or quality 
soever, found grievous to the commonwealth’.122  
Charles made it clear from an early stage in the investigation that the very 
existence of parliament was at stake. In his speech of 29 March, the Lord Keeper, 
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speaking on Charles’ behalf, instructed the Commons to cease the investigation into 
Buckingham and to vote adequate supply. Some MPs, the King believed, were 
cynically using his need for wartime supply for their own political ends. As the Lord 
Keeper said, they appeared to think that the King was ‘so far engaged’ in war that 
there was ‘no retreat’, but warned them that this was ‘no way to deal with kings’. As 
he reminded them, ‘parliaments are altogether in my power for the calling, sitting 
and continuance of them. Therefore as I find the fruits either good or evil they are to 
continue or not to be’. 123 The King reinforced this in a message of 20 April, in which 
he insisted that supply should precede the redress of grievances and warned that if 
he did not receive swift satisfaction he would be ‘driven to change his counsels’.124 
The reference to a ‘change of counsels’ was menacing but ambiguous. Could it 
perhaps refer to a change in the King’s military plans? As Sir Dudley Carleton 
confessed on the same day that Charles’ message was delivered, he did not know 
what ‘other counsels’ might be, but ‘what other princes have done in the like cases 
all do know’.125 In his speech of the 12th May, Carleton elaborated further. 
Parliaments had existed in other countries, until their kings had become so distasted 
with their ‘tumultuary endeavors’ that they had abandoned them altogether. This 
constitutional change was what ‘new counsels’ meant.126 These comments appear to 
have anticipated the Venetian ambassador’s later claim that Charles had asked the 
Bishop of Mende about ‘the means used by the kings of France to rid themselves of 
parliament’.127 
Buckingham was perceived as playing a central role in attempts to undermine 
parliament. The pricking of MPs who had opposed Buckingham during the Oxford 
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session of the parliament of 1625 as sheriffs and the imprisonment of Arundel, one 
of his most powerful enemies at court, were thought to have implications for the 
future of parliament. As John Rous wrote, these actions were thought to make way 
for ‘the utter bringing under of parliamentary power’.128 The Venetian ambassador 
believed that Buckingham’s ‘chief design... is to destroy the authority of parliament 
and impose taxes at pleasure’, and passed on rumours that Buckingham had 
attempted to convince the Lords that they alone could grant taxation, without the 
support of the Lower House.129 These rumours probably sprang from the debate in 
the House of Lords on 7 March, in which it was agreed that the Lords should propose 
to the Commons that they provide a supply for military expenditure. Buckingham’s 
efforts to create new peers were also seen as part of an attempt to ‘destroy the 
authority of parliament’. 130  The declaration the Commons drew up against 
Buckingham in June blamed the Duke for the King’s decision to collect Tonnage and 
Poundage without parliamentary consent and warned that any who advised him to 
adopt ‘new counsels’ would be accounted ‘vipers and pests to their king and 
commonwealth’.131  
Religious divisions were also deeper and more intractable than Russell 
believed. According to Russell, Turner’s query about Buckingham’s support of 
recusants ‘his mother and father-in-law being known papists’ was merely a criticism 
of the Duke’s ‘readiness to patronize all his kindred’ rather than a ‘pure issue of 
religion’.132 In fact, the query cast an obvious aspersion on Buckingham’s own 
religious allegiances. Rumours that Buckingham was a Catholic had been circulating 
since at least 1623.133 Further fuel was added to such fears when the French 
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marriage treaty, which Buckingham played a major role in negotiating, established 
de facto Catholic toleration, although the government had swung once again 
towards persecution by the time parliament met. The charge relating to 
Buckingham’s support of recusants was dropped during the investigation, but the 
issue was reignited later in the Parliament, when it was alleged that the Duke had 
bowed to the sacrament during a public procession in Spain.134   
Similarly, while Russell claimed that Arminianism was only a minority 
concern, there were certainly worries that Buckingham was either insufficiently 
opposed to Arminians or an active supporter of them.135 The York House conference 
had demonstrated that Buckingham would not come down decisively on the anti-
Arminian side, and In the initial stages of the attack, his critics accused him not so 
much of crypto-Catholicism as of ‘Juglynge in matters of Religion to boulster vp his 
faccions’. 136  During the debate about whether the charge that Buckingham 
supported recusants was a cause of the grievances of the commonwealth, Sir Walter 
Erle said that ‘Mr. Montagu receives too much countenancing from the Duke’.137 Dr. 
Meddus similarly told the reverend Mead that Buckingham was the ‘great protector 
of the Montagutians; so that the business of religion is like to follow his standing or 
downfall’.138 In this context, Buckingham’s appointment as Chancellor of Cambridge, 
giving him control over the training of large numbers of clergy, could be construed as 
part of a wider Arminian conspiracy. Even for those who did not go so far, 
Buckingham’s reputation as an unprincipled ‘juggler’ who sought support from all 
sides made him potentially dangerous. Anti-Arminian MPs wanted a staunch 
defender of orthodox Calvinism near the King rather than someone who inclined 
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whichever way the religious winds happened to blow. Nicholas Tyacke has followed 
Russell in arguing that religion played a ‘negligible element in the charges’ against 
Buckingham.139 While this is true in the narrow sense that the charge that he 
encouraged recusants was dropped early on in the investigation, Buckingham’s 
critics clearly connected him with the threat of popery and Arminianism in 1626, and 
this gave his removal or continuation in office a wider significance for the future of 
religion than might otherwise have been the case.  
As we have seen, the weight of evidence overwhelmingly suggests that 
Buckingham’s critics sought his ‘ruin’ rather than his ‘reformation’. When placed in 
their proper context, Russell’s sources do not imply that negotiations between 
Buckingham and his enemies were taking place. Critics of the Duke were much less 
amenable to compromise than Russell suggested, and there is plenty of evidence to 
suggest that his enemies sought his disgrace. While MPs considered setting up a 
West India Company to prosecute the war against Spain, there is no reason to 
believe that this was necessarily intended as an alternative to the Duke’s removal 
from power. Nor were MPs merely the agents of their aristocratic court patrons. 
They were quite capable of taking the initiative in attacking the Duke, and the House 
of Commons continued to be an important site of political conflict throughout the 
session, not least because Charles still hoped to secure parliamentary subsidies and 
wished to avoid the blame for the dissolution.  
Finally, the impeachment demonstrates the extent to which ideological 
assumptions could sharpen political conflict and vice versa, even relatively early in 
Charles’ reign. Although we might expect something of a honeymoon period 
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between King and Parliament, it is striking how quickly the atmosphere soured 
following the ‘blessed revolution’ in foreign policy of 1623-4. Buckingham’s critics 
might have been satisfied with his ‘reformation’ if his perceived faults were merely a 
matter of incompetence. But in a context of growing ideological conflict between the 
crown and its critics, his actions appeared to be much more sinister, and only the 
‘ruin’ of the Duke would do. After failing to remove Buckingham in 1625 and 1626, 
his enemies in the House of Commons initially declined to attack him in 1628 and 
concentrated on restoring the liberties of the subject instead. Yet during the 
negotiations over the Petition of Right, Sir Edward Coke named Buckingham as the 
‘grievance of grievances’, and the remonstrance presented to Charles on 17 June 
urged the King to remove him from power.140 In the end, the conflict between 
Buckingham and his enemies was settled not by parliamentary impeachment but by 
the knife of John Felton.  
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